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This paper explores the negotiations and the emerging socio-political relationships and 
alliances that were formed to reach a series of water-sharing agreements between 
upstream and downstream communities, in order to secure water required for continued 
urbanisation of the downstream town. The research focused on the socio-political actors 
and users of the Dhulikhel drinking water supply system of Nepal. Primary data was 
collected through key informant interviews, focus group discussions and stakeholder 
workshops to explore the development of the negotiation process and the agreement, 
and the role of different actors. The qualitative data was analysed through narrative 
and discourse analyses. During the negotiation process, political leaders from both 
communities were involved in the formation and acceptance of the agreement. The long-
term negotiation that started during the 1980s culminated in a series of agreements, the 
last of which formally introduced cash incentives to the upstream community in 2011. 
The downstream urban community has been paying NPR one million per annum to the 
upstream community for their continued role in the sustainable management of the water 
catchment. The paper provides insights into the shifting power relations between local 
rural and urban socio-political actors who play a vital role in water access negotiations, and 
2 
New Angle: Nepal Journal of Social Science and Public Policy Vol. 6(1), December 2019
fundamentally influence the potentials and effectiveness of incentive-based mechanisms 
to secure water needs. 
Keywords: Incentives, negotiation, actors, ecosystem services, water security
development and life needs, as captured 
by the Goal 6 and Goal 15 of sustainable 
development goals (SDG, 2015) and that 
sustainable and sufficient water access 
is widely used as an indicator of the 
developmental progress of societies (Dore 
et al., 2010). 
Local water management gives rise 
to potentially novel interlinkages and 
relationships between upstream and 
downstream communities, particularly 
as water supply systems in downstream 
areas are typically significantly influenced 
by upstream activities (Thapa and Paudel, 
2002; Martinez et al., 2013). Over the past 
decade, there has been a growing tendency 
to use Payments for Environmental Services 
(PES-like) schemes as an innovative tool to 
secure water to downstream areas and to 
incentivise ‘better’ manage local natural 
resources in the upstream (Wunder, 2005; 
Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola, 2008; Kosoy 
et al., 2007). In theory, PES approaches 
can enhance the welfare of transacting 
communities by creating win-win situations 
for the parties involved (cash to upstream 
land managers, guaranteed water supply 
to downstream users) as well as improving 
natural resource management (Wunder, 
2007).  Other scholars have considered PES 
as an incentive for local communities to 
secure their efforts for conserving nature 
through the redistribution of livelihood 
INTRODUCTION
Himalayan ecosystems provide a wide range 
of goods and services to people living in 
rural and urban regions (MEA, 2005; Rasul 
et al., 2011; IPBES, 2018). More than half 
of humankind depends on fresh water 
that is captured, stored, and purified in 
the Himalayan regions (Grêt-Regamey et 
al., 2012). However, the ability of these 
ecosystems to continue to provide the same 
quality and quantity of water has been 
considerably degraded at local and global 
levels in recent years (MEA, 2005; Wunder 
et al., 2008; Irena and Meine, 2018). Many 
Himalayan towns are under severe strain 
from environmental degradation and a lack 
of basic services, including water supply 
systems that are under increasing demand 
from continuous population growth and 
urbanisation (Tiwari et al., 2018). Hence, 
local watershed management can be critical 
for supplying clean water as large water 
supply systems are costly to develop and 
maintain (Rai et al., 2018). The sustainable 
management of water resources is becoming 
a challenge especially given a changing and 
uncertain future climate, a rapidly growing 
population that is driving increased social 
and economic development, globalisation, 
and urbanisation (Cosgrove and Loucks, 
2015). At the same time sustainable water 
resource management is important to meet 
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resources, through financial recognition 
of the work behind environmental 
management (Gutman, 2007; Kumar 
and Managi, 2009). Chan et al. (2017) 
characterised PES as a tool for enabling 
sustainable relationships with nature, 
conserving and restoring ecosystems and 
their benefits for people. Securing drinking 
water through a PES- like scheme can 
be a cost-effective solution compared to 
other alternatives (Rai et al., 2017) and 
hence, such schemes are increasingly being 
introduced and promulgated worldwide 
(Rode et al., 2015). 
It is recognised in the literature that the 
negotiations to establish PES-like schemes 
are political (Hope et al., 2007; Kovacs 
et al., 2016), but there is little detailed 
exploration of these dynamic politics 
(Corbera et al., 2009). With this backdrop, 
this research aims to explore the negotiation 
dynamics between two communities having 
diverse interests for reaching an incentive-
based water agreement. Our research has 
explored the following questions:
• How do power relations between 
two communities influence the 
development,  introduction and 
establishment of an incentive-based 
agreement for water? 
• W h i c h  a c t o r s  w e r e  i n v o l v e d 
i n  e sta b l i s h i n g  t h e  i n c e nti ve -
based agreement? What are their 
characteristics and geography? 
• What are the incentive types and 
mechanisms that have been offered by 
downstream communities, and how 
have these been received and mobilised 
by the upstream community?
With these research questions, we argue 
that in Himalayan countries like Nepal, 
incentive-based water agreements are 
mostly influenced by the bargaining powers 
and relative socio-political relationships 
between the communities underpinning 
PES negotiations. Further, incentives 
are a direct outcome of negotiations 
between actors, rather than the ‘objective’ 
rationales and processes that underpin the 
identification and qualification of ecosystem 
services and their flows, or the reflection 
of environmental management costs and 
economic valuations of such services. We 
examine the role of actors and communities 
underpinning these processes below. 
In this paper, we consider the above 
questions through the case study town of 
Dhuilkhel, which has a well-established 
drinking water supply scheme, with a 
PES-like water agreement that was the 
result of protracted negotiations among 
upstream and downstream actors. The 
objective of these negotiations was to 
secure ever-increasing amounts of water 
to downstream, rapidly urbanising and 
consolidating urban settlements. During 
the negotiation process, political leaders 
from both downstream and upstream 
communities were involved in the formation 
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and acceptance of the agreement. The 
communities referred to in this paper are 
the Kalanti Bhumidanda village in upstream 
Dhulikhel, where Dhulikhel town is the 
downstream community located in the 
Kavre district of Nepal. Dhulikhel town has 
had formal long-term water agreements 
with Kalanti Bhumidanda since 1985 to 
secure the towns’ water supply. The water 
supply scheme of the town has been 
considered one of the most successful and 
well-recognised incentive-based water 
supply systems in the country (Joshi et 
al., 2014). Our socio-political analyses in 
this case looks at the way that local social 
relations of power have shaped the water 
agreement. In the following sections of 
the paper, we present our conceptual 
framework, our data collection methods and 
local context, followed by empirical findings, 
discussion and conclusions respectively. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Our work focuses on the importance of 
understanding and paying attention to social 
and political relationships between actors 
within any negotiation process, to better 
account for how these relations influence, 
in this case, water access and development 
trajectories. In the present case, the socio- 
political relationship refers to the systems 
composed of both social and political 
elements belonging to the upstream and 
down-stream community and interaction 
between them (Alfredson and Cungu, 
2008; Mollinga, 2008). These relations are 
composed of institutions, individuals, and 
the community as a whole. 
The concept of power is central to 
understanding the processes and structures 
associated with natural resource governance 
and policy reform, including management 
decentralisation, the introduction of 
markets or market-like institutions and the 
redefinition of distributive mechanisms and 
property rights (Raik et al., 2008). Scrutinising 
power dynamics with regards to PES can 
help to understand both the huge expansion 
of PES in the policy arena as well as the 
grounded impacts of PES schemes on social 
and economic relationships of communities 
(de Francisco, 2013). Muradian et al. (2010) 
considers PES as the outcome of complex 
power relations, distributional issues and 
social situatedness. An uncritical embrace 
of PES that neglects how politics, culture, 
and economy govern implementation 
could reinforce existing power structures, 
inequalities, and vulnerabilities (Corbera et 
al., 2007, Pascual et al., 2014). Design of PES 
for watershed services requires negotiation 
with multiple stakeholders—providers, 
beneficiaries and intermediaries—who 
often have varied, sometimes conflicting, 
positions (Hope et al., 2007, Corbera 
et al., 2009, Van Hecken et al., 2015). 
Negotiations over PES schemes to develop 
a shared understanding of the diverse 
interests, assets, capacities, and power of 
players can take significant time, as does 
the building of trust between stakeholders 
(Dietz et al., 2003; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; van 
Noordwijk et al., 2008). As environmental, 
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socio-economic, and political contexts 
change, the signals and outcomes created 
by incentive-based mechanisms can also 
change (Jack et al., 2008). Indeed, the 
process of negotiations among actors 
can play a more important role than the 
‘scientific’ studies that determine and justify 
Ecosystem Services (ES) and economic 
valuation approaches to the management 
of water (de Groot and Hermans, 2009); 
after all, the introduction of PES approaches 
find receptivity (or not) in specific contexts. 
In PES schemes, buyers and sellers are 
heterogeneous (e.g. they have a wide array 
of world views, histories, social status, 
interests, connections, types of knowledge 
behind their positions, terms of valuation 
through which they see nature, economic 
status and development opportunities) and 
negotiations may profoundly shape and 
colour these. De Francisco (2013) suggests 
that a water-related PES scheme might 
contribute to changing historical inequities 
between the upper and lower areas of a 
catchment, increasing the bargaining power 
and status of providers of environmental 
services in upland areas. On the other hand, 
PES may also legitimise large-scale water 
consumption downstream. Therefore, a 
salient issue is who has the power to decide 
on the criteria relating to distribution of 
water as ecosystem services in this case. 
This research sets out to explore, empirically, 
how these theoretical forms of power occur 
in relation to PES-like scheme within a 
socio-political context comprising many 
heterogeneous actors. The Nepalese social 
structure is mostly heterogeneous in nature 
with key stratifying factors including caste, 
ethnicity, gender, economic class by wealth 
(rich, middle and poor), employment 
(especially within the bureaucratic and 
political system), and level of education 
(Uprety, 2006). The heterogeneous nature 
of Nepalese society quite makes bringing 
social actors together for building consensus 
around the management of natural 
resources complex. The growing demand 
for resources, widespread poverty, together 
with inadequate incentives for natural 
resources management further add conflict 
(Uprety, 2007). 
STUDY AREA AND METHODS
This research explored the drinking water 
supply system in Dhulikhel, Nepal. Dhulikhel 
is a small municipality and the district 
headquarter of Kavrepalanchok district, 
about 32 km east of Kathmandu, Nepal. 
With panoramic views of the Himalayan 
peaks, it is a tourist destination, as well as an 
emerging centre for education and health, 
home to both Kathmandu University and the 
community managed Dhulikhel Hospital. 
The town has a population of about 16,263 
people in 3291 households (CBS, 2012). 
Situated at 1550 metres, the urban area is 
only about 4 percent, and it is dominated 
by rural and agricultural land (73.6 per cent) 
and forestland (22.4 percent; Dhulikhel 
Municipality, 2011). 
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In Dhulikhel, the water supply system 
is managed by the community via the 
Dhulikhel Drinking Water Users Committee 
(DDWUC), which is regarded as an exemplary 
community-managed water supply system 
in Nepal. It now supplies around 90 
percent of the population, covering wards 
2,3,4,5,7,8,9 and some parts of wards 1 and 
6. In addition, 27 public taps from nearby 
sources, which pre-date the main pipeline, 
provides water for drinking and other uses 
both to the few households without piped 
supplies, as well as supplementary support 
for those with piped supply. The source of 
the main gravity pipeline’s quality drinking 
water is primarily from Saptakanya fall, 
from a stream named Kharkhola located in 
Kharkhola Mahabharat Community Forest, 
in Kalanti Bhumidanda village, 13.5 km away 
(DDWSSUC, 2014; MoUD Nepal, 2015). The 
Kharkhola source is one of the tributaries of 
the Roshi river, which is a tributary of the 
Koshi, a transboundary river. 
This paper uses the narrative and discourse 
analysis of qualitative data. Qualitative 
data was collected through key informant 
interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions 
(FGDs), interviews with local users and 
workshops with stakeholders. KIIs were 
conducted with 20 key informants including 
officials and former executive committee 
members of the Dhulikhel Drinking Water 
Users Committee (DDWUC), political leaders 
involved in the negotiation processes with 
upstream communities in 1985, officials 
from the Municipality and District soil 
conservation office, representatives from 
Kathmandu University (KU) and Kavre Valley 
Integrated Drinking Water Supply Project 
(KVIDWSP). Primary foci of the KIIs were on 
the processes of negotiations and up and 
downstream relations for the securement 
of water sources to Dhulikhel, and the 
management and distribution of water 
within Dhulikhel. Further, 37 interviews 
were conducted with local community 
members who were beneficiaries of the 
water negotiations within both upstream 
and downstream communities. Interviews 
with upstream farmers were focused on 
the issues related to negotiation with 
Dhulikhel water users committee, use 
and management of forest resources, 
and the use of incentives provided by the 
downstream community. Interviews with 
downstream users concerned access to 
water and the issues related to quantity and 
quality of water over time.
Three FGDs were held: one amongst 
downstream community members and two 
in upstream communities. The downstream 
FGD was with officials, executive members 
and users of Dhulikhel DWUC, and officials 
of the municipality. The FGDs conducted 
in the upstream included key stakeholders 
such as VDC3 officials, representatives of 
the community forest user group (CFUG) 
and local farmers. The FGDs with the 
3 A Village Development Committee (VDC) in Nepal was the lowest administrative unit of the Government 
(1990-2017) which was dissolved according to New Constitution of Nepal 2015.
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downstream community concerned access 
to water and the issues related to quantity 
and quality of water over time. Similarly, 
FGDs with the upstream community were 
focused on the issues related to negotiation 
with the Dhulikhel water user’s committee, 
use and management of forest resources, 
and the use of incentives provided by the 
downstream community. Two stakeholder 
workshops were held with officials from 
the municipality, District Development 
Committee, District Soil Conservation 
Office, District Forest Office, Department 
of Environment, Dhulikhel Drinking Water 
Users’ Committee, Kavre Valley Drinking 
Water Supply project, and upstream VDCs 
officials. Interviews were conducted in 
Nepali and recorded and transcribed into 
English. Field diaries and field reflection 
notes were also considered within the 
analysis and for the data validation. 
The development of the Water 
Agreement
In  th is  section,  we provide detai l 
on the process of negotiation and the 
involvement of socio-political actors within 
the negotiation process for the water 
agreement. Negotiations between the two 
communities started while the downstream 
community faced acute shortages of water 
in the 1980s. The then influential political 
leaders of the downstream community 
started a dialogue with upstream political 
leaders, mainly with those who belonged 
to the Panchayat system, and those who 
were in a formal position e.g. chair of Village 
Panchayat4. We recount how long-term 
negotiations between these socio-political 
actors concluded with an agreement with 
cash incentives in 2011.  
Dhulikhel town entered into the first formal 
agreement with Kalanti Bhumidanda in 1985 
for the supply of water to its inhabitants 
and for the management of water source 
at the upstream. In the 1980s, Dhulikhel 
was suffering from water scarcity and 
started looking for support to construct a 
water facility for its inhabitants. As a part 
of their exploration, they approached the 
then German development agency, GTZ, 
that was working in the water sector in 
Nepal, at Bhaktapur. Responding to local 
demands and needs, the GTZ accepted the 
request of Dhulikhel, and started working 
with the Dhulikhel Development Board 
(DDB). Initially, GTZ explored different 
water for Dhulikhel jointly with the DDB. 
The DDB approached the community of 
Kalanti Bhumidanda, which sits alongside 
the Roshi source and started a dialogue 
with the community about the possibility 
of piping water to Dhulikhel from the 
Roshi, through their community and land. 
Responding to the appeal of DDB, the then 
Bhumidanda village panchayat discussed 
the issues within a wider citizen forum and 
4 A Village Panchayat in Nepal was the lowest administrative unit of the country during the panchayat regime 
(1960-1990) in the country.
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agreed to provide water to DDB, recognising 
the water needs of Dhulikhel. The upstream 
community placed a single condition on this 
request at that time: they asked Dhulikhel 
to contribute towards the construction of 
a school building that had been damaged 
by a great flood. The condition was agreed 
by the DDB, and accordingly an agreement 
was made on July 27, 1985. During this time 
a single party-political system functioned 
under the direct rule of the Monarch 
in Nepal, where the head of the village 
was led by the Pradhan Pancha (elected 
Chairperson of the Village Panchayat). To 
come to this agreement, the role of the then 
political leaders of the communities and 
the local government remained significant 
to foster the negotiation process, and 
the negotiations themselves were formal 
and largely confined to these leaders, 
although the upstream did hold village 
meetings to discuss the proposals. The then 
Pradhan Pancha of the Kalanti Bhumidanda 
Village Panchayat - a signatory of the 1985 
agreement on behalf of the upstream 
community explained how the socio-
political relationship was at that time:
Pradhan Pancha from Dhulikhel Nagar 
Panchayat - the district head quarter (who 
is my friend too) requested us to provide 
water for the Dhulikhel people who were 
suffering from water scarcity. In response, 
we requested them to construct our local 
school building as it was damaged by the 
then huge flood of the Roshi river in 1981. 
The Pradhan Pancha agreed to the conditions 
we put forward, and accordingly, as per the 
decision of the Village Council, we decided 
to allow them to take water.
The struggle of Dhulikhel town for accessing 
water did not end with the agreement made 
in 1985. The shifting political paradigm in 
the country from a single party political 
system contributed to local-level upheaval: 
from 1990, the multi-party democratic 
system was introduced, only to be usurped 
by the Maoist people’s war between 
1996-2006, and the establishment of 
the republic with the abolishment of the 
monarchy in 2006. The 1990 constitution 
of Nepal provided the freedom to citizens 
to raise their voices and concern through 
multiple ways and means that were locally 
novel. As a result, local people became 
empowered to raise their voices and 
concerns through different forums. In 
line with these changes, the upstream 
community at Bhumidanda demanded more 
and more from the downstream, despite 
the fact that the downstream community 
provided multiple forms of support (the 
details of the support are recounted in the 
section below). Regarding the increasingly 
frequent demands originating from the 
upstream community, the Dhulikhel DWUC 
chair stated that “The demands were also 
fuelled in later stages by the fact that there 
was no responsive elected government at 
the then-VDC since 2000.”5  
5 The local-level government was established in 2017 through election as per the Constitution of 
Nepal (2015) but there was no local-level government for close to twenty years prior to this.
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Responding to demands from the upstream 
community as well as increasing water 
needs of the downstream, after 25 years, the 
Dhulikhel DWUC made another agreement 
with the then Bhumidanda VDC on May 
8, 2011. This added more provisions to 
provide economic benefits to the upstream 
communities. For the second agreement, 
the negotiation process was started since 
2000. Responding to the request of the 
Dhulikhel DWUC to forge consensus on 
the demand and supply of water, the then 
mayor of the Dhulikhel Municipality and 
the then DDC chair started dialogue with 
the then VDC chair of Kalanti Bhumidanda. 
The chairperson of Dhulikhel DWUC himself 
played an active role in the negotiation 
process to bring the actors into a constructive 
dialogue. Members of all-party mechanism 
(APM)6 from upstream played a crucial 
role as during the negotiation process, 
facilitation of local institutions and their 
representation was a prominent need and 
had to incorporate the help (and interests) 
of non-traditionally political actors. The 
manager of the Dhulikhel DWUC opined,
In the negotiation process, Kathmandu 
University (KU) and Dhulikhel Hospital acted 
as a facilitator or mediator between the 
communities in bringing the negotiation 
to a conclusive end. The Vice Chancellor of 
KU himself was involved in the negotiation 
process.
In the negotiation process the downstream 
community was thus more powerful than 
the upstream due to its administrative 
offices, representations from influential 
political leaders, and possessing the elected 
local institution, the Dhulikhel DWUC, which 
by the 2000s was a well-established local 
institution. During the absence of formally 
elected local representatives, such local 
institutions were de facto responsible for 
meeting the demands of the local people. In 
addition to this, well-established educational 
institutions like Kathmandu University and 
Dhulikhel Hospital located at Dhulikhel 
represent powerful stakeholder interests 
(and are significant water consumers) in 
their own right, where both lobbied for the 
increased water take sought by Dhulikhel 
town.
As per the agreement, additional facilities 
were agreed to be financed by downstream 
Dhulikhel. These included an NPR7 800,000 
annual payment to the upstream VDC, as 
well as additional support (NPR 200,000) 
for two schools (NPR 100,000 per annum 
for each school), a university scholarship 
established for upstream residents at the 
Kathmandu University, and discounts for 
poor and marginalised people in Dhulikhel 
6 Provision of All-Party Mechanism (APM) was formally introduced in 2009 to fill the vacuum 
of elected government at the local level which was later dissolved in 2012. The APM members 
comprised the representatives of the major political parties based on the vote that they received 
in the national election.
7 NPR is the Nepalese Currency. 1 USD ~NPR 111 in April 2019.
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Hospital. The agreement further provisioned 
to increase the transferred sum (NPR 
800,000 agreed) by NPR 100,000 every five 
years. In addition to these, the downstream 
community agreed to increase the annual 
payment for the guarding of the forest with 
an area of about 200 hectares (Kharkhola 
Mahabharat Community Forest), where the 
water source is located. The downstream 
community also demanded an increase in 
the volume of water from a 6- inch (agreed 
in 1985) to a 10-inch pipe supply. 
During the first agreement process, 
negotiations may be regarded as relatively 
smooth and simple, where the time required 
to forge a consensus and an agreement 
was short in comparison to the second 
agreement. During the first agreement, 
the public participation norms of the single 
party-political system were dominant, 
where local people were minimally 
involved in formal decision-making. These 
dynamics have greatly changed since the 
introduction of the multi-party democratic 
system after 1990, wherein people’s 
rights are guaranteed by law. This is likely 
one reason why the bargaining power 
of the upstream community increased 
and several contentious meetings were 
required through nearly 11 years to come 
to the second agreement. Continuous 
political engagement and negotiation 
among upstream and downstream 
communities played a vital role for a cash-
based agreement to supply water to the 
downstream community.  
Incentives to upstream 
community
As an incentive to the upstream community 
for their efforts at resource management in 
the upstream, the downstream community 
has paid a total of NPR 9,536,000 from the 
first agreement in 1985 till 2014. While 
55% of the payment provided from the 
downstream community was for community 
infrastructure, 8% was for education, while 
34% was granted to the VDC, only 3% was 
allocated directly for forest management, 
which is closely linked to water source 
conservation. There was no formally 
stipulated allocation of funds for different 
purposes within the 1985 agreement 
document.
 
 
55%
8%
3%
34%
Infrastructure/Development
Education
Forest Conservation
VDC Grant
Fig 1: Incentives provided and distribution in different 
sectors (Source: Field Data, 2014).
After the second agreement, the upstream 
community started to receive NPR 
1,000,000 per annum from the DWUC on 
behalf of the downstream community. 
In addition to the amount mentioned in 
the agreement, the upstream community 
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successfully negotiated an additional 
NPR 36,000 per annum for the salary of 
a forest guard. A forest guard attempts to 
prevent illegal extraction of forest products, 
controls grazing and other aspects of forest 
management. Figure 1 gives the incentive 
provided and its distribution in different 
sectors of the upstream community
DISCUSSION
The review of the agreements made for 
the water security of Dhulikhel township 
and discussions with different stakeholders 
shows that several rounds of social 
interactions between community members 
enabled the agreement to take shape. 
It is important to understand the social 
networks and linkages that reinforce the 
need for embedded social negotiation of 
PES-like contracts, as in this case, rather 
than the introduction of standardised 
templates developed elsewhere (Kolinjivadi 
et al., 2014). As elaborated in the result 
section, wider socio-political changes 
greatly influenced water negotiations. Being 
a single party-political system, the consensus 
process of the first agreement was smooth 
and less hectic, with a single condition 
imposed on water take by Dhulikhel: 
construction of a school building. However, 
the second agreement took several years 
and several rounds of negotiation meetings 
to come to an agreement in the multiparty 
political system. Here, the bargaining 
power of the water provider, the upstream 
community, increased with socio-political 
change in the country and with establishing 
the culture of payment, though Dhulikhel 
remained more powerful. The upstream 
community seemed to also be more active 
in negotiations to receive more incentives, 
which led to the emergence of a strongly 
cash-based agreement in 2011. Provision 
of cash incentives of one million per annum 
to the upstream in the second agreement 
reflects that political change over time can 
change the interests of people, reflected in 
the incentive-based mechanisms (Jack et 
al., 2008).
Prominently, Dhulikhel, which is the 
district headquarter of Kavre, is politically 
more powerful than the upstream rural 
community. This is also reflected by one 
of our key informants from the upstream 
community, who told us,
Dhulikhel is the centre of power, where 
institutions linked with authority like the 
police, administrations and other institutions 
are clustered. We must go to Dhulikhel to get 
state services like citizenship, land ownership 
registration and electricity access and so on. 
If we don’t allow them water access, we have 
a fear of being deprived, or of experiencing 
difficulties in accessing such state facilities.
The centre of power was also reflected 
in the agreement dated 1985, which 
clearly mentioned that Dhulikhel – as the 
district headquarter, where government 
offices were located – faced water scarcity. 
Communities’ relative standing and 
bargaining power also depended on the 
types of available water sources, such as 
river or spring sources (Joshi et al., 2018). 
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One of the key informants from Dhulikhel, 
who also played a crucial role in the 
negotiations said, “We had no other options 
than to make negotiation with upstream 
community because they owned water 
sources, as the water source lies in the forest 
they have been managing”.
This  denotes a  recognition of  the 
frequently unseen work behind maintaining 
environmental resources, which in this 
context gave rise to claims for compensation 
for continued support. From the perspective 
of Dhulikhel town, increased demand of 
water was a critical issue in 2011 because 
of the expansion of water users in the 
peri-urban area of Dhulikhel. From the 
perspective of the upstream community, 
these increased demands needed to be 
matched with higher compensation. As a 
water provider, the upstream community 
were continuously applying greater pressure 
for more benefits from the downstream 
community in order to develop their 
community in terms of education and 
road access. As a water recipient, the 
downstream community wanted to come 
up with a stable long-term agreement 
with their upstream community to secure 
growing water demands of the community. 
Accordingly, through a series of meetings, 
the two communities came to an agreement 
where downstream community incentivised 
the upstream community with cash 
support worth NPR one million per-year 
in recognition of management efforts of 
the water source. As claimed by one of the 
officials of the Dhulikhel DWUC, to conclude 
for the second agreement, “There were a 
series of interactions up to 18 times among 
the actors of both communities”. 
One of limitations of the 2011 agreement 
was the recognition of the Community 
Forestry User Groups (CFUGs) who were 
playing a prominent role in the protection 
of the water source. Agreements must 
consider historical costs and duties for 
the management of the same resource 
(Kovacs et al., 2016). The water source area 
in the upstream community is managed 
by the Kharkhola Mahabharat CFUGs 
under the Forest Act 1993 of Nepal and 
related regulations, which empowers CFUG 
members to manage their forest resources 
as common-pool resources and consider 
CFUGs as independent entities. The CFUG is 
the actual manager of the upstream forest 
resource and its associated ecosystem 
services, but the executives of CFUG are 
not among the negotiators and decision-
makers in the agreement process. In the 
whole negotiation process, the then VDC 
authority, together with the then APM, 
was signatory of the agreement on behalf 
of the upstream community. Hence, CFUG 
was excluded as an institution and did not 
receive direct funding. A similar exclusion 
was found by Khatri (2009) in the case of 
Kulekhani hydropower, where similarly the 
PES mechanism did not provide economic 
incentives to the CFUGs and other local 
organisations looking after watershed 
management activities. Other studies have 
highlighted how even non-participant 
households within targeted communities are 
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considered potential recipients of incentives 
within PES schemes (e.g. Huang et al., 2009), 
which is also evident from the case of Costa 
Rica, where to get a better outcome from 
the payment for watershed services, the 
national programme introduced a series 
of modifications to promote participation 
of small farmers and indigenous peoples in 
order to be more inclusive of all potential 
stakeholders (Porras et al., 2008). 
In the case of Dhulikhel, the practice of 
incentives started in 1985, a product of 
the first period of negotiations between 
the up and downstream. The downstream 
community paid a total of NPR 9,536,000 
between 1985 and 2014. However, the 
mode of payment was determined without 
any consideration given to any measurement 
or evaluation of the relevant ecosystem 
services. There are well-established 
methods and approaches that have been 
applied in a Himalayan context (de Groot 
and Hermans, 2009; Rasul et al., 2011). On 
the other hand, existing literature suggests 
that environmental service buyers do not 
always have a clear definition of what 
environmental services they are paying 
for as there may be problems of high 
complexity, uncertainty, and imperfect and 
asymmetric information in the linkages 
between desired environmental services 
and ecosystem management practices 
(Muradian et al., 2010; Muradian and Rival, 
2012). Therefore, a fully developed market 
approach, in which PES would function 
precisely according to economic theory, 
remains more a theoretical abstraction than 
an empirical possibility. In addition, it seems 
that the payment made by downstream 
settlements are essentially compensation 
for water diversion, as there is (currently) 
enough water flowing from the source. 
Downstream areas are not currently 
planning or concerned with future water 
scarcity scenarios.
Similarly, the increment of NPR 100,000 
payments every five years now received by 
the upstream community was not clearly 
linked to value determination, nor to how 
long the downstream community retained 
their willingness-to-pay to the upstream. 
The question is now being reformulated 
to how the Dhulikhel DWUC will manage 
to meet the growing demands of the 
upstream community, and the expected 
periodic growth of the sum by NPR 100,000 
every 5 years. The increased amount 
implies an increase to downstream users’ 
water bills. In the long run, downstream 
users may question the utility of the 
current arrangement, and the entitlement 
of upstream communities to demand 
payment. From the perspective of upstream 
community, they acknowledge an ongoing 
challenge to justify their incremental 
monetary demands. One of the key 
informants from the upstream community 
expressed his dissatisfaction towards the 
2011 agreement as:
The calculation of an increment of NPR 
100,000 every 5 years without proper 
valuation of water is not appropriate 
and cannot do justice to the upstream 
community who protect upstream resources 
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by providing water to the downstream. The 
downstream community are paying us only 
because they are in acute water need.
Such dissatisfaction from the upstream 
community with the process of the 
negotiation and the lack of grounding in 
payments’ size relative to work or economic 
service valuation may lead to conflict in 
the near future. Bhatta et al. (2014) has 
suggested that a standardised method to 
determine the flow of services and the 
realistic price for the use of such services 
needs to be well- supported and tested 
before being adopted. Such an approach 
may not only minimise the potential for 
disagreement and conflict but will also 
give a scientific and standardised basis for 
negotiations. 
Analysis of economic incentives to the 
upstream shows that only 3% of the total 
amount is allocated to forest management. 
This is a voluntary contribution by the 
community for forest management as per 
the community forestry approach, which 
has been ongoing for the last twenty years. 
In contrast, more than 55% of the total 
incentive has been invested in infrastructure 
development. One of the key informants 
from the upstream community argued:
The development process in Bhumidanda was 
initiated only after Dhulikhel diverted water 
for its inhabitants, and basic infrastructure 
was essential for us during those days. 
Nowadays, large part of the money that we 
receive from the downstream has been used 
in development activities as our community 
is still underdeveloped. In addition to this, 
little portion of the money is used in school 
education for local children as we need to 
pay salary of school teacher from our own 
contribution.
Incentive-based ecosystem service 
management can contribute towards 
building consensus between communities 
and is thereby instrumental for facilitating 
downstream–upstream problem-solving 
(Kosoy et al., 2007). The analysis reveals 
that incentive-based mechanisms with long-
term interactions among the actors play a 
crucial role for negotiation which ultimately 
sustains water security in the downstream 
(Dore et al., 2010; Joshi et al., 2014; Bhatta 
et al., 2014 and Joshi et al., 2018).
Mechanisms of incentive-based ecosystem 
services management not only require a 
payment culture (Wunder, 2013) but also 
need to consider clear mechanisms for 
benefit- sharing amongst communities 
(Bhatta et al., 2014). Our analyses show 
that the annual payment made from the 
downstream community was primarily 
compensation for securing access to 
water. As water demand increases, the 
downstream community’s willingness to pay 
to the upstream service providers become 
greater to ensure a greater supply of water.
CONCLUSION
This paper analysed the negotiation 
dynamics between two communities’ 
intent on establishing a water-sharing 
agreement. These agreement approaches 
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have a long history in the Himalayas and 
in Nepal. We have drawn attention to the 
changing dynamics between actors over the 
past 30 years, as the involvement of local 
communities become more possible and 
more politicised through the past decades 
of political development in Nepal. These 
power relations, the degree of resource 
scarcity and urbanisation, the urgency of 
demand have all played an important role 
in Dhulikhel for determining the terms 
of negotiations, the sought incentives by 
upstream communities, and their ability 
to realise an agreement, over and above 
scientific approaches to ES. The outcome 
of long-term negotiations between up and 
downstream stakeholders have achieved 
not only a joint agreement to protect 
and supply water resources, but at the 
same time now provide support to the 
community forest user group and several 
community development initiatives in the 
upstream. Power relations between local 
rural and urban socio-political actors play 
a vital role in water access negotiations, 
and fundamentally influence the potentials 
and effectiveness of incentive-based 
mechanisms to secure water needs. Such 
power relationship in negotiation can 
be a new knowledge in PES or PES like 
agreement.
Furthermore, Dhulikhel drinking water 
users committee, Kathmandu University, 
and Dhulikhel Hospital still need to be 
linked within new federal institutions such 
as the Municipality (Dhulikhel) and Rural 
Municipality (Bhumidanda) for long- term 
sustainability. New mechanisms for linking 
up- and down- stream may also give rise 
to new governance considerations around 
how federal institutions can upscale and 
recognise existing water agreements, and 
how future negotiation dynamics to ensure 
sustainable water supply in the years to 
come will be affected. 
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